Abstract-As efforts are made to increase the number of devices connected wirelessly, interference continues to be a challenging barrier to the efficient performance of wireless networks. We consider interference in a wireless network under a game-theoretic model where wireless users seek to maximize a difference between their information rates and the rates of other users in the network. A user must allocate power between its channel input and an interference input that is injected into its competitor's channel. Nash equilibria (NE) for the K-user game are characterized when the game is played over one block transmission. Under certain symmetry conditions on the users, it is shown the power allocated to each user's interference input goes to zero at the single block NE as the number of users in the network grows large. When the two-user game is played over consecutive blocks, it is shown that two-user cooperation is feasible such that an interference-free game equilibrium can be enforced.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are driven by complex interactions between separate and independent actors. For this reason, game theoretic models and tools have been used to understand how users in a network interact to share the wireless medium [4] . Typically, these users are modeled as possessing an objective to optimize a function of their own communication performance metrics (e.g. latency, rate, etc.).
Decentralized power control in a CDMA uplink is considered as a game in [2] , [3] . In [3] , the game is played over a multicarrier network and an iterative algorithm is proposed for equilibrium play. Users are considered with variable power budgets and rates in [2] . In [1] , [5] , [6] , worst-case interference is studied as a zero-sum game between a user and jammer. These references consider the network users to have the singular interest of maximizing a function of their own rate. In contrast to this, we consider some examples where a wireless user's objective is to maximize the difference between its rate and the rates of other users in the network.
LTE-Unlicensed (LTE-U) aims at improving cellular performance by extending LTE into the unlicensed 5 GHz band. Compatibility issues between LTE-U and WiFi have been considered in [4] , noting that without coexistence mechanisms, an LTE-U base station (BS) may transmit on a channel occupied by Wifi devices. In this scenario, WiFi devices This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2017-12935 C will concede the channel to the more aggressive LTE-U BS. Clashes for spectrum resources can also be observed in spectrum games such as the DARPA Spectrum Challange (SC) and Spectrum Collaboration Challenge (SC2), where cognitive radio networks compete for the most reliable communication in an environment with scarce bandwidth [7] , [10] . In the first SC, a radio could inject interference into an occupied band in order to force the incumbent radio from its channel or reduce the competitor's throughput. Motivated by these scenarios, we consider interference in a network game such that each user's utility appropriately captures the incentive to out-perform the other wireless users.
In this paper, we model a power allocation game between K users in a wireless network where each user seeks to maximize the difference between their information rate and the rates of the other users in the network. Predictions are made about the level of interference power in the network as users choose whether to budget their power towards increasing their rate or interfering with their opponents' rates.
II. CHANNEL AND GAME MODEL
We describe the ith user's point-to-point channel for i = 1, ..., K followed by a formulation of a game played in a network with K links. The ith user's channel output for n = 1, .., N channel uses is given by
where
n ∈ R ri are the ith user's channel input, channel matrix, additive interference from K − 1 users, and additive white Gaussian (AWG) noise with zero mean and variance σ 2 w . We assume that H (i) is constant over one coding block (N consecutive channel uses). We further assume that perfect channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT) of H (i) is available to all K users.
The kth user (k = i) can use this side information to inject the worst-case interference into the ith user's channel. With knowledge of the ith user's channel matrix, the kth user can decompose
= 0 otherwise, which we can interpret as L i orthogonal channels. This allows the kth user (k = i) to precode the AWG interference s (i) k along the worst-case direction [1] for the ith user such that
where denotes transposition. With perfect CSIT, the ith user's information rate is defined as
where ρ (i) and σ
are the input channel power and input interference power, respectively, into the ith user's th orthogonal channel (interference from the kth user) such that E[s
Li , 0, ..., 0}. We now consider a continuous game G = (I, S, U) between a set of users I = {1, ..., K} in a wireless network where the users compete for the highest rate difference over the period of a single block transmission. G is a stage game such that all users simultaneously choose their power allocation strategies at the beginning of the block. The ith user selects a strategy from its strategy space
I ≤ P (i) } ∈ S seeking to maximize the utility u i ∈ U such that
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a coefficient characterizing the competitiveness between users and P
i,j are the total channel and interference input powers for the ith user, respectively. P (i) is the user's average power budget over a block.
Although the strategy for the ith user is (
i ) ∈ S i , we sometimes abuse notation and refer to (P (i) X , P (i) I ) ∈ S i as the strategy when confusion can be avoided. We also define {−i} ≡ {1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ..., K}.
III. CONTINUOUS GAME
We perform analysis on game G to predict how the K users will behave in the network described above. In the first theorem, the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) for the two-user network with zero-sum utilities is characterized. It is shown that two-user equilibrium play is interference-free when both users are experiencing low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). In Theorem 2, it is shown that under some symmetry conditions on G, the interference power allocated by each user at NE play goes to zero as the number of users in the network grows large. In this section, we assume that all diagonal channel coefficients are of similar magnitude and set λ 2(i) = 1 for all channels and , i. This assumption allows for tractable analysis and may be reasonable considering that the weaker singular values of H (i) are abandoned by the user during the waterfilling process. Lemma 1 [1, Lemma 2] (worst-case noise) : Fix K = 2 and let G = (I, S, U ) where U = {R 1 , −R 1 } (user 2 is a jammer). When the first user's channel coefficients are all one, G has a unique NE where the power allocated to the first user's th channel is given by
The proof can be found in the original paper. Theorem 1: Let K = 2 and let all channel coefficients for both users be one. For game G with zero-sum utilities (α = 1), the unique Nash equilibrium of the ith user is
are evenly distributed among the channel and interference inputs.
Proof. When K = 2, the dimensionality of the space over which the ith user is optimizing u i is L 1 + L 2 . By applying Lemma 1, we can reduce the dimension of the problem to two variables and write the ith users optimization problem as
Problem (7) has a concave objective with a convex constraint. Verifying that P (i) * X satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of (7) when P
is sufficient to show that we have found a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, uniqueness is guaranteed since (P
) is the only fixed point in the two users' best response correspondences.
If we add symmetry to the two users such that L 1 = L 2 = L and P
(1) = P (2) = P , we see that (6) reduces to
From (8), it is clear that when our game is symmetric, two users will allocate about half of their power budget towards interference at NE. As the power budget of both users decreases for a fixed σ 2 w , each user loses the incentive to interfere with its opponent's channel. Evaluating the rate of each user at (8), the sum-rate of the symmetric two user network is equal to 2L log(2) for 0 ≤ σ 2 w ≤ P . From here, we see that the sum-rate of the network at symmetric NE is equivalent to an interference free network only at low SNR. In the next theorem, we show a condition when the symmetric game in high SNR results in NE strategies with low interference power.
Theorem 2: Let all K users' channel coefficients be one and let
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider the first user's (i = 1) optimization problem which can be rewritten into the equivalent form minimize β − R 1 with respect to β, ρ (1) , σ
The objective function of (9) is convex over the optimization space. Furthermore, Ω = {σ
The KKT conditions are satisfied when all users equally distribute P * X = P (K − 1)/(K − 1 + α) over their channel inputs and the remaining P * I = P − P * X equally over their interference inputs. Therefore, a NE exists when all user play P * I = αP/(K − 1 + α). For a fixed α, P * I can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a large enough K.
So far, we have shown that interference in the network diminishes either when users are experiencing low SNR or when the number of users grows large. For a network with a small number of users, an additional structure is needed in the game to deter users from interfering with high SNR channels. This structure is considered in the next section.
IV. SEQUENCE OF TWO-USER GAMES
In order to show that interference-free cooperation between two users is feasible, we modify the two-user game from a single-stage to a multi-stage game over consecutive blocks. In this section, we first motivate and perform discretization of both users' channel states and strategy spaces followed by a description of an infinite sequence of stage games between the two users. We end the section by showing the viability of a cooperative tit-for-tat (TFT) inspired protocol.
To motivate discretization of the channel state and strategy space, we consider how the two users may play a single stage at extreme channel conditions. In Section III, we showed that for the symmetric two user game G with zero-sum utilities, the unique NE at high SNR occurs when both users spend half of their power budget on their channel inputs. To get an estimate of this equilibrium for non-zero-sum case, we approximate the ith user's rate at high SNR as
Repeating the analysis of Theorem 1 with general α and the high SNR approximate utilityR i −αR (−i) , the power allocated to the ith user's channel input at NE play is given by
We note that equilibria (11) and (6) coincide when α = 1. We also note that if the ith user's opponent strays from equilibrium and allocates all of its power to its channel input, strategy (11) continues to maximize the ith user's approximated utility. We also want to get an idea of the users' equilibrium behavior when the two users experience a difference in SNR. When the ith and (−i)th user's channels are in high SNR and low SNR, respectively, the NE strategies when the ith user maximizesR i − αR (−i) and α = 1 are given by
HL and ρ
LH are approximately P and 0 respectively so we redefine ρ Intuitively, in a game of zero-sum utilities when one user has significantly better channel conditions than its competitor, that user focuses mostly on its own channel input while the competitor resorts to jamming. The final equilibrium to consider is the case where both users experience low SNR. Since this was already considered in the previous section, we simply restate the equilibrium ρ (i) LL = P with the additional note that the strategy is dominating such that it maximizes u i regardless of how the other user plays. Together, the equilibria ρ
HL and ρ (i)
HH capture the importance that channel state plays when making a good prediction about the users' behavior during one block. In the remainder of the section, we use these equilibrium strategies to construct a sequence of games that captures each user's incentive to interfere with its opponent as channel states change.
We now define a stage gameĜ SNR1,SNR2 = (I, S SNR1,SNR2 , U SNR1,SNR2 ) between two users I = {1, 2} with symmetric power budgets P
(1) = P (2) = P , utilities
}, and strategy spaces
}. The SNR parameter describes the state of the ith user's channel conditions as either high SNR (SNR i = H) or low SNR (SNR i = L). Therefore, the ith users strategy space in the game stageĜ SNR1, SNR2 is a discretized space S SNRi,SNR (−i) i = {ρ SNRi,SNR (−i) , ρ C } such that the user can play their single stage equilibrium strategy or cooperate (ρ C = P ). When confusion can be avoided, we drop the user identifying superscript from the above equilibrium strategies. We observe that when a user's competitor is in state L, the user's single stage equilibrium strategy coincides with the cooperative strategy, and we simplify the ith user's strategy space to be one of the four sets
is defined by (4) where the users' channel coefficients can take on two values given by λ 2(i) = 1 >> σ 2 w and λ 2(i) = σ 2 w when the ith user is in high and low SNR. The discretizing of strategy spaces and channel state allows us to describe each stage as 1 of 4 payoff matrices, shown in Fig. 1 .
With the game stage at each pair of channel states defined, we consider a sequence of stage games {Ĝ t } ∞ t=1 played over t = 1, 2, 3, ... consecutive blocks. At the tth block, the channels of both users are fixed at (SNR 1,t , SNR 2,t ) and the game is played on stageĜ t =Ĝ SNR1,t,SNR2,t . After the tth block, the channel state of the ith user transitions with probability
independent of the state of the (−i)th user's channel. We assume that the users have memory of the history of stages and strategies played up to the current block, but only have statistical knowledge of the upcoming stages. The objective of the ith user is to maximize its expected payoff over all blocks, denoted by E[u i ].
To illustrate that cooperation is feasible between the two users, we fix the second user's play with a modified tit-for-tat strategy and show that playing ρ C at each stage optimizes the first user's expected payoff. The second user's strategy is fixed as follows. Let {Ĝ We assume that the second user's strategy is a protocol known to both users; that is, user 1 knows of the second user's titfor-tat strategy and knows that it cannot coerce its opponent to stray from protocol.
To maximize E[u 1 ], user 1 can separately maximize its expected payoff inĜ
The second user's play and the next stage in a subsequence are both independent of past stages and the play in those stages. This observation allows the first user to optimize its expected payoff over a stationary distribution on its strategy space given both the current stage and its last play in the subsequence of the current stage. The left diagram of Fig. 2 shows the strategy transition diagram of the two users in subsequenceĜ H tj . Term q k is the probability that the first user will cooperate in the next subsequential stage given that the current stage is played with the strategies labeled at state k = 1, 2, 3, 4. The next state transition matrix is
show that From Fig. 2 , it is clear that when q 1 = 1, a subsequential game that starts in state 1 will never leave that state and q 2 , q 3 and q 4 play no role.
We can describe the second subsequential gameĜ L tj with its own strategy transition diagram, shown on the right side of Fig. 2 . Here, state 1 corresponds to the beginning of the stage gameĜ LH where the first user then decides to cooperate with probability q or jam with probability 1 − q. The quantity p S is the probability that the next stage in the subsequence is the same game as the current stage, and can be written in terms of p H and p L , although the terms will cancel in the stationary distribution. The next state transition matrix is
with the stationary distribution π L = 
We can check that the sum of the first user's utilities at cooperative strategies is greater than or equal to the sum of the utilities when one user is jamming, so condition (19) holds and cooperation with probability one maximizes E[u 1 |Ĝ L tj ]. Recombining the two subsequences, we conclude that the first user's cooperation at each stage inĜ t maximizes E[u 1 ].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We perform a Monte Carlo simulation of N = 10, 000 game stages in the sequenceĜ t where α = 0.5, P = 1, p H = 0.25, p L = 0.125 and σ 2 w = 0.01. Fig. 3 shows the cumulative average change in u 1 (denotedū 1 ) vs the first user's probability of cooperation at each state. Specifically, for the curveū 1 vs x ∈ {q, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 }, the average of u 1 is taken over N stages and the probabilities {q, q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 } \ {x}. It is clear that the first user's cooperation at each state with probability one maximizesū 1 . Furthermore,ū 1 sees the largest increase over the step ∆x = 0.1 as q 1 increases from 0.9 to 1.0 such that the first user commits to the equilibrium ofĜ H tj . VI. CONCLUSION Equilibrium analysis was performed for a multiuser network game where the users allocate power to maximize a difference between their rate and the rates of the other users. With certain symmetry conditions on the game, the single block game results in zero-interference equilibrium strategies in the limit when K grows large or when SNR is small. A zerointerference equilibrium can otherwise be enforced when the two-user game is played over consecutive fading blocks. For this equilibrium, we illustrated cooperation between two users with a numerical example.
